Uprising begins in Kyrgyzstan

Stratfor breif:

Kyrgyzstan lies in a region where two great powers -- Russia and China -- tend to view any disturbing events as part of a conspiracy orchestrated by the United States.

Kyrgyzstan: New Challenges in
Great-Power Relations

By George Friedman

Protesters wearing pink and yellow armbands succeeded in ousting the regime of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev, overtaking the presidential palace in Bishkek early March 24. Akayev and his family reportedly fled by helicopter to Russia.

The fall of Akayev's pro-Russian regime, in what has been dubbed the "Tulip Revolution," could be viewed as yet another blow for Moscow in its near abroad, where a series of pro-Western "velvet" revolutions have been steadily shrinking Russia's sphere of influence. Now, it is not clear that what has occurred in Kyrgyzstan is indeed a pro-Western revolution. The opposition is hardly a unified movement: Clan affiliations, ethnic divisions and other internal demographics are all in play. And, as some have noted, the fact that demonstrators have been unable to settle on a common color for their armbands does not bode well for consensus on larger political matters.

Recognizing that a forecast for political upheaval in Central Asia does not necessarily draw screaming headlines, it is important to remember a few geographic facts. Kyrgyzstan is nestled high in the Tien-Shan Mountains, bordering China on its south and east. And, as a former part of the Soviet Union, it remains of strategic interest to Russia. What makes all of this particularly interesting is that both Russia and China have a tendency to view any upheaval in regions where they take interest as part of a conspiracy orchestrated by the United States in order to challenge their hegemony.

This might be paranoid thinking. It might be prudent "worst-case scenario" planning. Or it might be a rational appreciation of Washington's intentions. Whichever it is, the simple fact is that both regional powers regard any instability in any country in the area as being generated by the United States and intended to harm them.

Because Kyrgyzstan is part of the Muslim world, the United States certainly cannot afford to be indifferent to anything that happens there. U.S. forces are still conducting operations in Afghanistan and probing into Pakistan's northern provinces -- and supplying its forces there from a logistics base in Kyrgyzstan. That base is one of two interests Washington has in Kyrgyzstan; the other is making certain al Qaeda or other radical Islamist groups don't increase their power in the region. So it would stand to reason that Washington has no interest in fostering instability in Kyrgyzstan.

The Russians are not so sure. They see the United States turning its attention from al Qaeda to other issues, and they don't buy the Bush administration's line that its political involvement in the region -- specifically in Ukraine, where Washington helped secure a win by pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko late last year -- is simply about the American love for free elections. They believe the United States sought to install a pro-U.S. government in Kiev in order to bring Ukraine into NATO and undermine Russian national security.

Russian leaders also see the United States as locking down its power in Central Asia. The United States, having exerted influence in the region initially for economic development, had Russia's support when it introduced troops following the Sept. 11 attacks. Leaders in Moscow and elsewhere think the Americans now are using these troops to create a strategic reality: denying Russia its sphere of influence in the region. They think Kyrgyzstan is part of this strategy.

On the other side of Asia is China. Its westernmost province, Xinjiang, is predominantly Muslim and in rebellion against Beijing. Chinese leaders have never been comfortable with the American position on Xinjiang -- which seemed to argue that the U.S. war against al Qaeda was one thing, but that China's battle against Muslim separatists in Xinjiang was quite another. Government officials occasionally have indicated a belief that the Americans actually liked the Xinjiang insurrection because it weakened China.

The Chinese are concerned that instability in Central Asia will increase the flow of supplies to Xinjiang militants. Therefore, they view events in Kyrgyzstan as part of Washington's strategy to threaten China, at a time when Washington has pressured Europe to back away from arms sales to Beijing. The Chinese don't believe the United States is obsessed with al Qaeda any longer. They believe the Americans are obsessed with China, and they see events in Kyrgyzstan as a security threat.

Washington did not engineer the Kyrgyzstan rising, but it can use the uprising to increase its influence in Central Asia. The world has changed sufficiently that al Qaeda is no longer the top story; relationships among great powers are.

Kyrgyzstan is important because it affects these relations.