You mean....you might have been WRONG??!!!
Hopper @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 2:21 pm
At last someone in the current U.S. administration is conceding there is a possibility that mistakes were made..........
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/4654048/
Scape @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 3:18 pm
$1:
"Sorry we let unsubstantiated claims drive our coverage. Sorry we were dismissive of experts who disputed White House charges against Iraq. Sorry we let a band of self-serving Iraqi defectors make fools of us. Sorry we fell for Colin Powell's performance at the United Nations. Sorry we couldn't bring ourselves to hold the administration's feet to the fire before the war, when it really mattered.
Rev_Blair @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 3:19 pm
Now if they'd just go ahead and admit that they were lying...
feeko @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 3:54 pm
why, any sane person would say given the history that the probabillity that weapons were there....so they werent..big deal....Iraq is better off...so are we.....get over it already....
Scape @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 4:01 pm
That has more to do with luck then good management. What if Saddam had used chem/bio/nuclear weapons? He didn't and we are dam lucky he didn't. The US went in with the assumption he would use them. That is reckless intent. With that same intent you could take on North Korea or China. If you poke around in the bears den enough your going to be missing limbs. The jury is out if the Iraqi people are better of now, for there is no Iraqi but 30 different tribes who are most likely going to erupt into a civil war here soon enough. Stability is in the Iraqis best interest not further turmoil.
AdamNF @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 4:39 pm
Iraq is not better off. Iraq is now being ruled with an iron fist by the USA. Its now the most dangerus place in the word. People die everyday from from iraqi resistance. there will soon either be a religios civil war, or an all out attack on all US forces. its far from over and it will not end good.
Rev_Blair @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 5:39 pm
Most of the countries all over the world, including Canada, looked at the facts that the US was presenting and decided the US didn't have a case. Their intelligence was lacking (no pun intended) and everything they said was either conjecture or highly questionable.
Powell showed up at the UN with a couple of cartoon pictures and claimed that they were proof of WMD. He didn't want the UN to continue their work because he had some colourful drawings. That isn't an accident or misleading intelligence, it's a grown man pointing at fucking cartoons and saying, "See, we have pictures."
Powell lied. He knew he was lying. He was pissed off when nobody believed his lies.
AbeLincoln @ Sat Apr 03, 2004 8:51 pm
AdamNF AdamNF:
there will soon either be a religios civil war, or an all out attack on all US forces. its far from over and it will not end good.
Well that's atleast what the international community is hoping for. They would all rather see the US fall on it's face, than some good come out of a very bad situation.
Rev_Blair @ Sun Apr 04, 2004 3:15 am
That isn't what anybody is hoping for Abe. It is what's being predicted, but there is a difference between predicting and wanting.
AbeLincoln @ Sun Apr 04, 2004 12:31 pm
OK, so suddenly everyones Nostradamus!
Robair @ Sun Apr 04, 2004 1:36 pm
AbeLincoln AbeLincoln:
OK, so suddenly everyones Nostradamus!
The American public was duped into going to war and almost half the Canadian public was duped along with them. I'm assuming they are the same Canadians that watch Fox news instead of CBC. You should be asking questions Abe, instead you're defending your lying lyers in office. What's with that?
karra @ Sun Apr 04, 2004 3:50 pm
$1:
Their intelligence was lacking (no pun intended) and everything they said was either conjecture or highly questionable.
Comfortable being an armchair critic isn't it?
$1:
Iraq is not better off. Iraq is now being ruled with an iron fist by the USA. Its now the most dangerus place in the word. People die everyday from from iraqi resistance. there will soon either be a religios civil war, or an all out attack on all US forces. its far from over and it will not end good.
Axly, if you choose to recall, Saddam the Insane was purging his people by 25,000 a year, studying the effects of wmd on his people, pulling and cutting tongues from the heads of his people, pillaging the coffers of his people, allowing his sons to rape his people, and digging huge holes in the ground to accommodate the massive number of bodies of his people.
See anything wrong with this picture?
Yes indeed, Iraq is a poorer, less prosperous land because the United States went in and liberated twenty-five million people, gave them hope and freedom from tyranny.
AbeLincoln @ Sun Apr 04, 2004 4:23 pm
Robair Robair:
AbeLincoln AbeLincoln:
OK, so suddenly everyones Nostradamus!
The American public was duped into going to war and almost half the Canadian public was duped along with them. I'm assuming they are the same Canadians that watch Fox news instead of CBC. You should be asking questions Abe, instead you're defending your lying lyers in office. What's with that?
Actually, more than 70% of the American public was against the war and I am proud to say that I am one of them.(yeah i know that fact seems to be lost on the international public) But it isn't going to stop me from supporting my country now that they are in it. We're in this thing and we can't go back. So, why do nothing and bitch about it when I can do nothing and support the men and women(American and British) who are fighting and getting killed over there. The only thing that I can do is wait until July 30, 2004 and hope things go well. Then on November 9, 2004 vote Bush and his cronies out of the public residence that is our white house!!
And as for asking questions, I think questions are great. But from sitting where you are, how are your questions changing anything?
Rev_Blair @ Sun Apr 04, 2004 4:26 pm
It isn't a matter of being Nostradamus, Abe. It's a matter of looking at the evidence and considering where things will most likely lead. The predictions are never 100% but they are in pretty clear language. The majority of nations on earth, the majority of citizens on earth, said that this was going to turn out badly for all involved. Looking at the news this weekend, I'd say those predictions were accurate.
TTWC @ Tue Apr 13, 2004 1:53 pm
Well I haven't read the whole thread verbatim... but I would like to contribute a couple of interesting articles. The Americans were not the only ones who thought that Iraq had WMD. It is still a very viable possiblity that they may find some yet.
$1:
The NIE judged with high confidence that Iraq had chemical and biological weapons as well as missiles with ranges in excess of the 150 km limit imposed by the UN Security Council, and with moderate confidence that Iraq did not have nuclear weapons. These judgments were essentially the same conclusions reached by the United Nations and by a wide array of intelligence services—friendly and unfriendly alike. The only government in the world that claimed that Iraq was not working on, and did not have, biological and chemical weapons or prohibited missile systems was in Baghdad.
http://www.cia.gov/cia/public_affairs/p ... 82003.html
This article is from a friend in Sweden.
$1:
Regarding WMD. There was a very interesting articles in Swedish newspaper Expressen a couple of weeks ago. The former UN chief weapon inspector Rolf Ekéus, also a Swede, wrote an article on the subject "Hans Blix is driven by desire for revenge" after reading Hans Blix book "Disarming Iraq". He paints a completely different picture than Blix does.Here's a bad auto-translated version. I corrected the most interesting part in bold:
http://www.expressen.se/expressen/jsp/p ... p?a=121772
$1:
His Blix did it impossible for säkerhetsrådet that give road clear sign for a väpnat assault against Iraq. He use doubtful sources when he states that Iraq destroyed all forbidden weapon the summer 1991.
It writes before this governor for U.N.:s vapeninspektörer ROLF EKÉUS exclusively in Expressen after have last His Blix book "Disarm Iraq" that earlier in the week came out on swedish. Ekéus think that bokens many osakliga judgements hurts trovärdigheten also in the section that otherwise is intressanta.
The that expects that learn something if disarmament from His Blix book "Disarm Iraq" will become disappointed. That Blix self acknowledges was it U.N.:s vapeninspektörer on 90-talet, UNSCOM, that ombesörjde that Iraq was entirely befriat from massförstörelsevapen. When His Blix tillträdde that boss for Unscoms successor that organization, Unmovic, was jobbet that is conducted and Blix got other that syssla with and now also tell if. Boken shops if it politiska games that föregick Irakkriget. Blix hadn't just a åskådarplats on near hold without medverkade directly in important moment in U.N. under säkerhetsrådets treatment. In a conversation under krisveckorna before Irakkriget with the american säkerhetsrådgivaren Condolezza Rice, framhåller Blix that he bears it operativa ansvaret while säkerhetsrådet have it politiska.
It's also it most intressanta with Blix skildring how in effect säkerhetsrådet, and then foremost stormakterna, leaves ate Blix that, unless take it politiska ansvaret, as do the crucial politiska bedömningarna.
It goes for the two big föredragningarna that Blix, along with IAEA-chefen El Baradei, left to säkerhetsrådet the 27 january respective 14 february last the year.
The 27 january delivered Blix a devastating criticism against Iraq in order to not have accepterat the disarmament that krävdes in order to Iraq would gain international confidence. He anknöt to White husets requirements that Iraq must take it strategically the decision to relinquish its massförstörelsevapen. It was oundgängligt that the olösta nedrustningsfrågorna togs on earnest. Iraks new vapendeklaration hadn't besvarat some of these questions, which must lösas before nedrustningsakterna could shut. Blix hävdade that there for instance existed strong indikationer on that Iraq produced more forbidden mjältbrandsbakterier than what man medgivit. The list of kritiska judgements against Iraq was long. It can because occur something strangely that Blix says himself not have förutsett that the that he calls hökarna in Washington would become förtjusta over his presentation and that he done America a service.
Against this background is because Blix other big report 14 february to säkerhetsrådet of note. It is clear of Blix account that inspektionsverksamheten then previous rapporteringstillfälle not medfört some new medgivanden or avslöjanden. None "reeking pistol" existed that report. Not either had Iraq redovisat some forbidden weapon or capacities, meant Blix. Man got because not pull slutsatsen that weapon existed. Blix pointed on that many underrättelsetjänster was övertygade if that Iraq had forbidden weapon but established simultaneously that Unmovic not had found some forbidden items at the anläggningar that underättelsetjänsten utpekat. Säkerhetsrådets inspektionsmyndighet Unmovic could only report on basis of evidence that the self investigated.
After presentation 14 february stood it ready that Blix unlike previous föredragningar for säkerhetsrådet changed the politiska situationen in rådet through that put its analysis as that THE U.S.A.:s and Great britains endeavor that bring about a resolution for authorization of vapenanvändning against Iraq, received a backset and that other rådsmedlemmars antipathy against a väpnat answer on Iraks förmodade menace had stärkts.
It intressanta is that is that two redovisningar of the same sakförhållanden of presentatören, His Blix, could spinnas ones gone to benefit of krigsförespråkarna and the second gone to benefit of krigsmotståndarna in säkerhetsrådet. Blix, that experienced lawyer, must have been too aware if that he avgjorde the question through that decide himself was bevisbördan would be put, either "guilty until bevisad innocent" or "innocent until bevisad guilty". The 14 february chose he the later. Säkerhetsrådet had that is försatt himself self in a situation there it abdikerat from ansvaret to do the slutliga politiska the judgment. Blix döljer not its satisfaction with that the result of his report the 14 february became that säkerhetsrådet not could give road clear sign for a väpnat assault against Iraq. Now became it it is true war yet with a marginaliserat säkerhetsråd. Saddam Husseins helm reached its violent ände. Unmovic and Blix came too out, in particular when the american efterkrigsgranskningens leader and Blix Nemesis, David Kay, in the american the congress a hardly year after krigets end uttalat "We had all wrong" in what avsåg Iraks weapon. "Not I" could His Blix have svarat.
Unmovics inspektionsverksamhet omfattade not more than three and a half month while storasystern Unscom seemed in Iraq over seven year. Under the perioden ombesörjde Unscom along with IAEA the complete avväpningen of Iraq. Something acknowledgment of this is hard to find in Blix exposé. In bokens the first half searches the author sålunda do a critical examining of Unscom in a disadvantageous comparison with the own organisationen, Unmovic. When Blix speaks if självupplevda thing that Unmovic and säkerhetsrådet happens it with authority and safety, but when he comes in on areas that he know to just through hearsay becomes framställningen limping, repititiv and often misleading. Unmovic and Unscom was two nedrustningsinstitutioner with hederliga and seriösa co-worker. Blix states on the other hand that Unscoms inspektörer whose salaries betalades of the institutions that avstått from their services to U.N. would be benägna to collaboration with nationella underättelsetjänster. This is outrageous against the laboratoriechefer, seniora scientist and vapenspecialister that utgjorde Unscoms framgångsrika cadre. Blix uppger that his own, Unmovics personnel rekryterades from regeringarna, which of course according to my sentence not means any behalf for suspicion. Unscom-ledningen rekryterade however unlike Blix its inspektörer directly without that go through regeringarna, which innebar that institutionen could work with some of worlds the foremost specialists that with joy saw the possibility that for a couple of year search crack Iraks secrets. Only in exceptional cases, and when it gällde simpler statements, rekryterades by regeringar.
Koncentrationen in Blix exposé on fantasies if underrättelseverksamheten and Unscom is especially far-fetched that Unscom with exception for its the first verksamhetsmånader the summer 1991 not använde himself of something underrättelsematerial from regeringarna.
Blix assertions in this respect is confusing especially that the of him ledda Unmovic according to his own detaljerade skildringar devoted entire its short verksamhetsperiod in Iraq ate that on basis of american and brittiska intelligence statements search upp-täcka some irakiska vapengömmor.
A repetitive assertion in the book is that all forbidden weapon unilaterally was destroyed by Iraq the summer 1991 and that consequently Unscom never discovered any weapons. Here Blix refers to two fuzzy Iraqi sources, namely general Al Saadi and former chief of arms Hussein Camel. Both were notorious for their over any years repeative denial of the existance of Iraqi biological weapon programs which Unscom relieved and which both shamefully had to acknowledge in 1995. That Unscom with big costs and comprehensive engineering for two years destroyed huge amounts of chemical weapon storages seems to have completely passed Blix by, like the well-reported successful years 1995 and 1996 when newly imported hightech robot parts were discovered, a delivery on the bottom of the river Tigris, picked up by Unscom's own frogmen. Repeated discoveries and findings were also made of the nerve-gas VX and production equipment for VX. The complex and confrontation-charged surveying of Iraqi missile-programs and the discovery and identification of Iraq's secret "homemade" robot-engines is just another example on a list that could be made longer.
Even if Unscom and its activation is especially exposed for sakligt ogrundande judgements is maybe the biggest besvikelsen that Blix holds as painstaking bill on all personal oförrätter in order to not speak if förmodade oförrätter, and this in order to give ably again. This is beklagligt for it risks that something affect seriositeten and trovärdigheten of also the intressantare half of boken that tells if stormaktsspelet in säkerhetsrådet.
Of ROLF EKÉUS
Rolf Ekéus was U.N.:s chief weapon inspector in Iraq 1991 to 1997. It he most enjoyed in Iraq was the arbetsamma and seriösa the people and the for arab förhållanden relatively strong jämställdheten between men and women.
It writes before this governor for U.N.:s vapeninspektörer ROLF EKÉUS exclusively in Expressen after have last His Blix book "Disarm Iraq" that earlier in the week came out on swedish. Ekéus think that bokens many osakliga judgements hurts trovärdigheten also in the section that otherwise is intressanta.
The that expects that learn something if disarmament from His Blix book "Disarm Iraq" will become disappointed. That Blix self acknowledges was it U.N.:s vapeninspektörer on 90-talet, UNSCOM, that ombesörjde that Iraq was entirely befriat from massförstörelsevapen. When His Blix tillträdde that boss for Unscoms successor that organization, Unmovic, was jobbet that is conducted and Blix got other that syssla with and now also tell if. Boken shops if it politiska games that föregick Irakkriget. Blix hadn't just a åskådarplats on near hold without medverkade directly in important moment in U.N. under säkerhetsrådets treatment. In a conversation under krisveckorna before Irakkriget with the american säkerhetsrådgivaren Condolezza Rice, framhåller Blix that he bears it operativa ansvaret while säkerhetsrådet have it politiska.
It's also it most intressanta with Blix skildring how in effect säkerhetsrådet, and then foremost stormakterna, leaves ate Blix that, unless take it politiska ansvaret, as do the crucial politiska bedömningarna.
It goes for the two big föredragningarna that Blix, along with IAEA-chefen El Baradei, left to säkerhetsrådet the 27 january respective 14 february last the year.
The 27 january delivered Blix a devastating criticism against Iraq in order to not have accepterat the disarmament that krävdes in order to Iraq would gain international confidence. He anknöt to White husets requirements that Iraq must take it strategically the decision to relinquish its massförstörelsevapen. It was oundgängligt that the olösta nedrustningsfrågorna togs on earnest. Iraks new vapendeklaration hadn't besvarat some of these questions, which must lösas before nedrustningsakterna could shut. Blix hävdade that there for instance existed strong indikationer on that Iraq produced more forbidden mjältbrandsbakterier than what man medgivit. The list of kritiska judgements against Iraq was long. It can because occur something strangely that Blix says himself not have förutsett that the that he calls hökarna in Washington would become förtjusta over his presentation and that he done America a service.
Against this background is because Blix other big report 14 february to säkerhetsrådet of note. It is clear of Blix account that inspektionsverksamheten then previous rapporteringstillfälle not medfört some new medgivanden or avslöjanden. None "reeking pistol" existed that report. Not either had Iraq redovisat some forbidden weapon or capacities, meant Blix. Man got because not pull slutsatsen that weapon existed. Blix pointed on that many underrättelsetjänster was övertygade if that Iraq had forbidden weapon but established simultaneously that Unmovic not had found some forbidden items at the anläggningar that underättelsetjänsten utpekat. Säkerhetsrådets inspektionsmyndighet Unmovic could only report on basis of evidence that the self investigated.
After presentation 14 february stood it ready that Blix unlike previous föredragningar for säkerhetsrådet changed the politiska situationen in rådet through that put its analysis as that THE U.S.A.:s and Great britains endeavor that bring about a resolution for authorization of vapenanvändning against Iraq, received a backset and that other rådsmedlemmars antipathy against a väpnat answer on Iraks förmodade menace had stärkts.
It intressanta is that is that two redovisningar of the same sakförhållanden of presentatören, His Blix, could spinnas ones gone to benefit of krigsförespråkarna and the second gone to benefit of krigsmotståndarna in säkerhetsrådet. Blix, that experienced lawyer, must have been too aware if that he avgjorde the question through that decide himself was bevisbördan would be put, either "guilty until bevisad innocent" or "innocent until bevisad guilty". The 14 february chose he the later. Säkerhetsrådet had that is försatt himself self in a situation there it abdikerat from ansvaret to do the slutliga politiska the judgment. Blix döljer not its satisfaction with that the result of his report the 14 february became that säkerhetsrådet not could give road clear sign for a väpnat assault against Iraq. Now became it it is true war yet with a marginaliserat säkerhetsråd. Saddam Husseins helm reached its violent ände. Unmovic and Blix came too out, in particular when the american efterkrigsgranskningens leader and Blix Nemesis, David Kay, in the american the congress a hardly year after krigets end uttalat "We had all wrong" in what avsåg Iraks weapon. "Not I" could His Blix have svarat.
Unmovics inspektionsverksamhet omfattade not more than three and a half month while storasystern Unscom seemed in Iraq over seven year. Under the perioden ombesörjde Unscom along with IAEA the complete avväpningen of Iraq. Something acknowledgment of this is hard to find in Blix exposé. In bokens the first half searches the author sålunda do a critical examining of Unscom in a disadvantageous comparison with the own organisationen, Unmovic. When Blix speaks if självupplevda thing that Unmovic and säkerhetsrådet happens it with authority and safety, but when he comes in on areas that he know to just through hearsay becomes framställningen limping, repititiv and often misleading. Unmovic and Unscom was two nedrustningsinstitutioner with hederliga and seriösa co-worker. Blix states on the other hand that Unscoms inspektörer whose salaries betalades of the institutions that avstått from their services to U.N. would be benägna to collaboration with nationella underättelsetjänster. This is outrageous against the laboratoriechefer, seniora scientist and vapenspecialister that utgjorde Unscoms framgångsrika cadre. Blix uppger that his own, Unmovics personnel rekryterades from regeringarna, which of course according to my sentence not means any behalf for suspicion. Unscom-ledningen rekryterade however unlike Blix its inspektörer directly without that go through regeringarna, which innebar that institutionen could work with some of worlds the foremost specialists that with joy saw the possibility that for a couple of year search crack Iraks secrets. Only in exceptional cases, and when it gällde simpler statements, rekryterades by regeringar.
Koncentrationen in Blix exposé on fantasies if underrättelseverksamheten and Unscom is especially far-fetched that Unscom with exception for its the first verksamhetsmånader the summer 1991 not använde himself of something underrättelsematerial from regeringarna.
Blix assertions in this respect is confusing especially that the of him ledda Unmovic according to his own detaljerade skildringar devoted entire its short verksamhetsperiod in Iraq ate that on basis of american and brittiska intelligence statements search upp-täcka some irakiska vapengömmor.
A repetitive assertion in the book is that all forbidden weapon unilaterally was destroyed by Iraq the summer 1991 and that consequently Unscom never discovered any weapons. Here Blix refers to two fuzzy Iraqi sources, namely general Al Saadi and former chief of arms Hussein Camel. Both were notorious for their over any years repeative denial of the existance of Iraqi biological weapon programs which Unscom relieved and which both shamefully had to acknowledge in 1995. That Unscom with big costs and comprehensive engineering for two years destroyed huge amounts of chemical weapon storages seems to have completely passed Blix by, like the well-reported successful years 1995 and 1996 when newly imported hightech robot parts were discovered, a delivery on the bottom of the river Tigris, picked up by Unscom's own frogmen. Repeated discoveries and findings were also made of the nerve-gas VX and production equipment for VX. The complex and confrontation-charged surveying of Iraqi missile-programs and the discovery and identification of Iraq's secret "homemade" robot-engines is just another example on a list that could be made longer.
Even if Unscom and its activation is especially exposed for sakligt ogrundande judgements is maybe the biggest besvikelsen that Blix holds as painstaking bill on all personal oförrätter in order to not speak if förmodade oförrätter, and this in order to give ably again. This is beklagligt for it risks that something affect seriositeten and trovärdigheten of also the intressantare half of boken that tells if stormaktsspelet in säkerhetsrådet.
Of ROLF EKÉUS
Rolf Ekéus was U.N.:s chief weapon inspector in Iraq 1991 to 1997. It he most enjoyed in Iraq was the arbetsamma and seriösa the people and the for arab förhållanden relatively strong jämställdheten between men and women.